'The Bourgeoisie, Historically, Has Played a Most Revolutionary Part': Understanding Social Movements From above by Cox, Laurence & Gunvald Nilsen, Alf
Our interest in this is two-fold. On the one hand, we are 
interested in exploring and speaking to the experience of 
social movement activists, and in rendering theory useful 
to them. Part of our goal then is to reclaim Marxism as a 
particular form of reflection on this experience. On the 
other hand, we are interested in putting this inherited 
experience to work in the current context of neo-liberal 
globalisation and the movement of movements: to see if 
it has anything to offer on the crucial question of how the 
movement can and should develop if it wants to win. 
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Elsewhere we have explored related questions such as 
why activists might need theory at all (Cox and Nilsen 
2005a); Marxism as a theory of social movements 
(unpublished manuscript); and how society can be 
analysed in terms of social movements as the way in 
which human practice is organised (Cox and Nilsen 
2005b). 
 
- Abstract - 
‘From castles and palaces and churches to prisons and 
workhouses and schools; from weapons of war to a 
controlled press’, Raymond Williams writes, ‘any ruling 
class, in variable ways though always materially, 
produces a social and political order’. This productive 
activity constitutes the essence of what can be referred to 
as social movements from above.  
Our goal in this paper is to use this general analysis to 
explore neo-liberal globalisation as what we are calling a 
social movement from above. Elsewhere we have made 
an initial attempt on the question that follows from this, 
of how the movement of movements can win (Cox and 
Nilsen 2005c). Our interest here, then, is in understanding 
the historical context up to the mid-1990s or thereabouts - 
the “house that neo-liberalism built”, where it comes 
from and how it works – with a view to identifying 
effective tools for its demolition. 
This paper explores social movements from above as the 
organization of multiple forms of skilled activity around a 
rationality expressed and organized by dominant social 
groups, which aims at the maintenance or modification of 
a dominant structure of entrenched needs and capacities 
in ways that reproduce and/or extend the power of those 
groups and its hegemonic position within a given social 
formation.   
Starting from a theoretical conception of social structure 
as the sediment of struggle between social movements 
from above and those from below, the paper discusses the 
relevance of a conception of social movements from 
above to activist experience – in particularly as a way of 
avoiding the reification of exploitative and oppressive 
social structures.  
Part 1: Social Movements From Above  
 
1.1 What is a social movement from above? 
‘From castles and palaces and churches to prisons and 
workhouses and schools; from weapons of war to a 
controlled press’, Williams (1977: 93) writes, ‘any ruling 
class, in variable ways though always materially, 
produces a social and political order’. This productive 
activity constitutes the essence of what we refer to as 
social movements from above, here defined as the 
organisation of multiple forms of skilled activity around a 
rationality expressed and organised by dominant social 
groups, aiming at the construction, maintenance or 
modification of a structure of needs and capacities in 
ways that reproduce and / or extend the power of those 
groups and their hegemonic position within a given 
social formation. 
The paper moves on to an outline of a model of the fields 
of force animated by movements from above and below in 
understanding the major ‘epochal shifts’ and ‘long 
waves’ in capitalist development. This model is then put 
to work in a prolegomenon to an analysis of global 
neoliberal restructuring as a social movement from 
above aiming to restore the class power of capital over 
labour.  
This analysis aims to discern the hegemony of 
neoliberalism not as an accomplished and monolithic 
state of affairs, but as an unfinished process riddled by 
internal contradictions which the movement of 
movements might exploit in its efforts to impose an 
alternative direction and meaning upon the self-
production of society.  
We use this concept in contradistinction to social 
movements from below, the more normal referent of the 
term ‘social movement’ in routine sociology, to express 
two key points: 
(a) Collective agency is by no means only the 
product of the (relatively) powerless and exploited; 
almost by definition, in normal times it is more 
commonly, consistently and effectively produced by the 
powerful and wealthy. Class war from above, to cite a 
familiar discussion, is far more systematic and relentless 
than class war from below. 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper is part of a broader project of rereading 
humanist Marxism as a theory of social movement 
development, from the micro-level of “hidden 
transcripts” to the macro-level of revolutionary situations. 
Our purpose is to explore the situated collective action 
both of powerful groups (“social movements from 
above”) and of the less powerful (“social movements 
from below”) in a way that makes it possible to move 
beyond a romanticised opposition of structure and 
resistance.  
(b)  It is this collective agency which in practical 
terms underlies the construction of, and explains the 
continued reproduction and development of, social 
structures and institutions which serve the needs of those 
powerful and wealthy groups. Society does not fall from 
the sky, in other words; it is created the way it is, not 
solely due to the action of social movements from above 
(because they are faced with constant challenges from 
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below), but in ways which primarily reflect their position 
of routine dominance. 
1.3 Why do we need this concept, intellectually 
or politically? 
We have made two claims above for the value of this 
concept: that it demystifies social structure, and that it 
allows a rough comparability of similar types of action 
between the collective action of the powerful and that of 
the less powerful. At a slightly more systematic level, we 
can rephrase these as follows: 
Within the broad category of movements from above, we 
could distinguish various levels of development, from 
relatively local movements aimed at altering a situational 
balance of power in their favour, via institutions which 
sediment existing power relations, to political and 
economic projects aimed at the overall direction of a 
“world-economy”.  
(a) Rather than social structure, institutions etc. 
appearing as part of the given order of things, they appear 
as the results (not always directly intended) of the action 
of well-organised and powerful (because relatively 
successful) social actors. This is clearly a gain in 
understanding. 
It is this last category, which we distinguish as “social 
movement project”, that concerns us in this paper, 
particularly the social movement project from above 
known as neoliberal globalisation. Characteristic of such 
projects is complexity: the forging of alliances between a 
range of movements from above and subordinate 
supporters, structured around particular economic and 
political strategies which have different things to offer 
different parties, and under the overall direction of elites 
whose shared purpose has to be constantly reaffirmed and 
developed (as witness the G8, WEF, WTO, and Bretton 
Woods institutions). 
(b) Rather than social action appearing as the 
property of less powerful groups, or as a blip on the 
landscape against a stable background of given 
institutions, it here appears as a common denominator 
which underlies the actions both of less powerful groups 
and of those which control key social institutions 
(economic, state, cultural). This makes it possible to 
theorise social change without massive theoretical 
caesurae. 
 
1.2 What resources and strategies do such 
movements have? We hope that the use of this concept in part 2 below will 
be sufficiently convincing in terms of its intellectual 
usefulness to demonstrate these points. So far this is in some ways a circular definition: social 
movements from above are those which are successful in 
constructing and reproducing a social order which 
primarily suits them1. But what resources do such 
movements have which enable them to be (most of the 
time) successful in reproducing a world made to their 
measure, if not entirely to their specifications? 
Politically, we feel this concept is useful in two ways. 
Firstly, it relates immediately to activists’ experience of 
meeting conscious, determined and organised opposition 
rather than simply the inert resistance of a thing. In times 
of defeat, it expresses the experience of meeting an 
aggressive opponent with their own strategies and 
intentions which often overrule our own in practice. Following on Nilsen (2006a), on which this section of the 
paper draws, we can identify three kinds of resources that 
such movements draw on when developing movement 
projects: (i) a directive role in economic organisation; (ii) 
differential access to the state; and (iii) a leading position 
in terms of the moulding of everyday routines and 
common sense. Under “ordinary circumstances” a 
movement project from above may be able to rely on all 
three, but often it is a matter of converting one into 
another: for example, using military power to restructure 
the balance of workplace relations, or drawing on 
economic power to reorganise daily life. A social 
movement, or movement project, can usefully be said to 
be coming from above when it draws on at least one, and 
usually more, of these types of resources.  
Secondly, it enables us to demystify both the current 
situation (as the result of previous conflicts between 
movements from above and below) and our possibilities 
within it, rather than understanding ourselves as activists 
faced with an anonymous “system”, an amorphous 
culture of “normality”, or an all-knowing and malevolent 
“power”. The forces we are facing can certainly draw on 
elements of all three of these, but these three are 
themselves products of the successful past action of 
movements from above, and as such are subject to 
challenge. 
This, in the end, is the purpose of our analysis: to show 
that “the way things are” has been consciously produced, 
not only in the current era (to deconstruct the argument 
“There Is No Alternative”) but on a broader timescale (in 
other words, to show that capitalism is itself constructed, 
and constantly so). By doing this, we hope to open 
greater theoretical space for the possibility that 
movements from below might come to construct their 
own world successfully – if they are capable of defeating 
the currently dominant movements from above. But to do 
this, they will have to understand those movements from 
above, not simply in terms of the day-to-day workings of 
the world they have built, but in terms of who they 
comprise and what their goals are. 
Movements from above are routinely in conflict with 
movements from below, and can adopt various types of 
strategy to deal with this situation. Elsewhere (Cox and 
Nilsen 2005b) we have drawn a schematic distinction 
between defensive strategies (aimed at protecting a 
currently beneficial situation in the face of challenges 
from below through the use of a mix of accommodation 
and repression) and offensive strategies (aimed at 
extending or restoring the power of dominant social 
groups in the context of a systemic crisis).   
 
  
  
                                             
 1 Although this is a circular definition, it is not tautological, 
because it expresses a crucial point about the nature of the social 
order (see 1.1.b above).  
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Part 2: How Does Capitalism Come to Change? Social 
Movements from Above and Epochal Shifts in the 
Political Economy of Capitalism 
 
2.1: Capitalism – Abstract and Historical 
In abstract terms, capitalism can be defined as production 
undertaken through a particular form of social interaction 
– the capital-labour relation – in order to exchange what 
is produced – commodities – in a market for profit. The 
capital-labour relation – i.e. the relation between ‘on the 
one hand, the owners of money, the means of production, 
means of subsistence, who are eager to valorize the sum 
of values they have appropriated by buying the labour 
power of others; on the other hand, free workers, the 
sellers of their own labour power, and therefore the 
sellers of labour’ (Marx, 1990: 874) – constitutes the 
backbone of the expanded reproduction of value – most 
commonly represented by the circuit of capital: M – C … 
P … C’ – M’.  
As Marx (1990: 251) notes, the beginning and the end of 
the circuit of capital do not exhibit ‘any qualitative 
difference between its extremes’; most crucially, the 
social relation upon which the process rests – the capital-
labour relation – remains intact (see Bell and Cleaver, 
2000: 21). What does occur, though, is a quantitative 
change: ‘More money is finally withdrawn from 
circulation than what was thrown in at the beginning’ 
(Marx, 1990: 251). This ‘increment or excess over the 
original value’ (ibid.: 251) of course constitutes surplus 
value, which is funnelled back into the expanded 
reproduction of capital – i.e. M – C … P … C’ … M’, M’ 
– C’ … P ... C’’ – M’’.  
So far, so good – but the expanded reproduction of 
capital and thus the reproduction of the capital-labour 
relation is no smooth and simple matter; on the contrary, 
it is a profoundly crisis-prone affair. Crises of 
accumulation can be defined as interruptions in the 
reproduction process resulting from a failure of the 
different moments of the reproduction process to follow 
each other smoothly in a unified cycle resulting in a 
partial or total collapse of capitalist profits (see Bell and 
Cleaver, 2000: 26). These interruptions, in turn, emerge 
from the ways in which, in each of the moments of the 
circuit of capital – the purchase of commodity-inputs, the 
production process, the exchange of commodities – there 
occurs a conflictual encounter between the needs of 
capital – ‘the need of the existing values for valorization’ 
(Marx, 1990: 772) – and the need of workers – ‘the 
worker’s own need for development’ (ibid.: 772). In other 
words, they represent a collision between movements 
from above and from below. 
Now, if and when capital re-emerges from a crisis to 
posit growth again, the reproduction of the capital-labour 
relation will have gone through a metamorphosis2 which 
is expressive of a particular balance of class forces, and 
which in turn gives a particular form to the circuit of 
capital. Such metamorphic restructuring lies at the heart 
of epochal changes in capitalism, and the outcome will be 
either a restoration of the balance of class power in 
favour of capital or a compromise between capital and 
labour in which the balance of power is significantly 
altered in favour of the working classes3. To analyse the 
changing shape of capitalism, then, we need an analysis 
of the collective social action which constructs, 
maintains, and reconstructs it (movements from above) as 
well as of movements from below which can challenge 
this process. 
As soon as we engage with historical capitalism – 
capitalism as it is actually socially organized in a 
determinate spatio-temporal locale – we are confronted 
with the fact that ‘there is real scope for variation in the 
rhythm and course of capitalist development’ (Jessop, 
1990: 198). In order to grapple with this variation and 
scope, we shall use the concepts accumulation strategy 
and world hegemony, and we shall conceive of an epoch 
of capitalism as consisting of the confluence of the latter 
with the former on the basis of a particular balance of 
class forces – or in our terminology a particular encounter 
between movements from above and from below. 
An accumulation strategy is a particular way of socially 
organizing the different moments of the circuit of capital 
which ‘defines a specific economic ‘growth model’ 
complete with its various extra-economic preconditions 
and also outlines a general strategy appropriate to its 
realization’ (Jessop, 1990: 198). Each epoch of capitalism 
exhibits a dominant accumulation strategy. The 
construction and consolidation of an accumulation 
strategy rests upon complex equations of class power.  
First of all, an accumulation strategy must ‘unify the 
different moments in the circuit of capital’ (Jessop, 1990: 
199) under the hegemony of a particular fraction of 
capital. In other words, accumulation strategies are the 
outcome of social movement projects from above, 
exercising their directive role in economic organization 
on the basis of the achievement of some kind of unity 
between dominant social groups. Secondly, an 
accumulation strategy ‘must also consider the balance of 
forces between the dominant and subordinate classes’ 
(ibid.: 201) in the sense that the hegemony of an 
accumulation strategy ultimately depends upon the 
consent of subaltern classes. In order to grapple with how 
‘capital accumulation is the complex resultant of the 
changing balance of class forces in a struggle as they 
interact within a framework determined by the value 
form’ (ibid.: 197), we propose a heuristic of 
disembedding and reembedding (Polanyi, 2001).  
Situating class agency squarely at the centre of processes 
of disembedding and reembedding4, we propose the 
following. Disembedding entails the removal of 
constraints upon capital’s strategies to maximize surplus 
value in the various moments of the circuit of capital, and 
an accumulation strategy that is characterized by 
                                            
                                            
3 A third outcome would of course be revolutionary 
transformation – i.e. a transition from a capitalist mode of 
production to an alternative way of socially organizing 
production. Here, however, we limit our discussion to crises that 
bring about immanent alterations rather than systemic 
transformations – i.e. what Lebowitz (2003: 165) calls ‘crises 
within capitalism’ rather than ‘crises of capitalism’.  See Cox 
and Nilsen (2005c) for our initial ruminations on revolutionary 
transformations.   
4 As Hart (2001) and Halperin (2004a/b, 2003) note, Polanyi 
fails to moor his analysis of disembedding/reembedding in a 
historical conception of social forces and class agency, thus 
attributing the latter to the rather nebulous social mechanism 
designated as ‘the self-protection of society’ (Polanyi, 2001: Part 
2)  2 On this point, see Fine and Harris (1979: 112).    
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disembedding is the outcome of capital’s successful 
pursuit of an offensive strategy in a situation of crises. 
Reembedding entails the imposition of constraints upon 
capital’s strategies to maximize surplus value in the 
various moments of the circuit of capital, and an 
accumulation strategy that is characterized by 
reembedding is the outcome of capital opting for a 
defensive strategy in a situation of crisis and labour 
opting for the modification of an essentially offensive 
strategy. In other words, a disembedded accumulation 
strategy testifies to a balance of class power in favour of 
capital, and, conversely, a reembedded accumulation 
strategy testifies to a balance of class power in favour of 
labour.  
Turning to the question of world hegemony, Arrighi 
(1994: 6) starts from the observation that there exists ‘a 
recurrent pattern of historical capitalism as world system’ 
which revolves around ‘the alternation of epochs of 
material expansion … with phases of financial rebirth and 
expansion’. During phases of material expansion, money 
capital sets in motion an ever-increasing bundle of 
commodities and the capitalist world system grows along 
a single developmental path. During phases of financial 
expansion, money capital extracts itself from the 
commodity form and seeks accumulation through 
financial deals. The dominant developmental path comes 
to thrust against and finally transcend its limits through 
radical restructuring (ibid.: 6-9).  
These cycles of expansion and restructuring of the world 
capitalist system have taken place ‘under the leadership 
of particular communities and blocs of governmental 
agencies which were uniquely well-placed to turn to their 
own advantage the unintended consequences of the 
actions of other agencies’ (ibid.: 9). The states capable of 
orchestrating the systemic cycles of accumulation on an 
ever-expanding scale exercise world hegemony; that is, 
they exercise ‘functions of leadership and governance 
over a system of sovereign states’ (ibid.: 27).  
In order for a state to be truly hegemonic it must be 
perceived as leading the system of states in general in a 
desired direction – i.e. it must be in a position to claim 
with credibility ‘to be the motor force of the general 
expansion of the collective power of rulers vis-à-vis 
subjects’ or ‘that the expansion of its power relative to 
some or even all other states is in the general interests of 
the subjects of all states’ (ibid.: 30). A state ascends to 
such a position of leadership in a situation of hegemonic 
crisis characterized by ‘systemwide financial expansion’ 
(Arrighi and Silver, 1999: 31), and eventually hegemonic 
breakdown, in which ‘systemic chaos’ comes to curtail 
‘the power of the system’s dominant groups’, thus 
generating a ‘demand for system-level governance’ 
(ibid.: 33) and clearing the ground for the consolidation 
of a new world hegemony.    
World hegemonies do of course have their feet on the 
ground; that is, they are moored in determinate 
constellations of class power. As Silver and Slater (1999: 
151) argue, the phases of systemic expansion that have 
been characteristic of the respective hegemonic periods 
‘have been based on social compacts between dominant 
and subordinate groups’. A hegemonic period, then, is 
typically characterized by a ‘virtuous cycle’ in which 
social peace and material expansion mutually reinforce 
each other, whereas a period of transition is marked by 
the coincidence of interstate and interenterprise 
competition with social conflicts leading to systemwide 
revolutions and the collapse of states – i.e. what we have 
elsewhere discussed as organic crisis (Cox and Nilsen 
2005b)5.  
Social conflicts are in turn related to the way in which 
systemic expansion leads to the transformation of an 
extant ‘world-scale balance of class forces’ (ibid.: 152): 
new social groups which had hitherto been excluded from 
the benefits of the hegemonic social compact grow in size 
and power to the extent that they are capable of 
challenging this compact and/or demanding their 
inclusion in it. As we shall see, the realignments of the 
balance of class forces on a world scale are closely 
intertwined with those conflictual processes which shape 
the equations of class power that underpin the dominant 
accumulation strategies of a given epoch of capitalism.     
 
2.2: A Brief Mapping of Historical Capitalism 
It goes without saying that a full and detailed mapping of 
the epochs of capitalism and the transitions between the 
various epochs defies the boundaries of the present paper. 
What we shall do, however, is to propose a broad-
brushed demarcation of four epochs in the development 
of historical capitalism according to the criteria 
delineated above, which can serve as a basis for a more 
substantial analysis of neoliberal restructuring as a social 
movement from above. 
Our goal in this section is twofold: firstly to map the 
development of these different epochs in terms of 
accumulation strategies and world hegemonies; secondly 
to trace some of the conflicts between movements from 
above and from below which underpin this process. The 
first moment, which appears as a discussion of structures 
and mechanisms, is in our terms an analysis of the 
content of particular movement projects from above; the 
second moment, which appears as a discussion of class 
power and crisis, is in our terms an analysis of the 
construction of these projects, typically in conflict with 
(and at times making concessions to) movements from 
below. 
Between the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries we can 
speak of the emergence of historical capitalism. Rather 
than an accumulation strategy per se, this was an epoch 
of primitive accumulation, i.e. the multiplicity of 
dispossessory processes through which two 
transformations are operated: the conversion of ‘the 
social means of subsistence and production … into 
capital, and the immediate producers … into wage-
labourers’ (Marx, 1990: 874)6. This, of course, was the 
original social movement from above for disembedding; 
it was, as Polanyi (2001: 37) notes, ‘a revolution of the 
rich against the poor’.  
This was also the epoch in which the initial extensive 
expansion of capitalism took place, i.e. the age of 
discovery and conquest – in itself a process of primitive 
accumulation in which the capitalist, with ‘the power of 
                                            
5 This does not entail the assumption that virtuous cycles are 
long and organic crises are short. The length of each is 
dependent on the strength of the movements from above which 
maintain virtuous cycles or lose their ability to direct affairs in 
periods of organic crisis. 
6 As Marx (1990: 876) notes in capital – and later reiterated in 
his critique of Mikhailovski (Marx, 1982) – primitive 
accumulation ‘assumes different aspects in different countries, 
and runs through its various phases in different orders of 
succession, and at different epochs’.  
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the mother country’ behind him sets out to ‘clear out of 
the way the modes of production and appropriation which 
rest on the personal labour of the independent producer’ 
(1990: 931). This epoch also witnessed the rise of the 
modern inter-state system from the origins of the regional 
sub-system of city-states (Venice, Florence, Genoa and 
Milan) which had crystallized in Northern Italy in the 
interstices of the medieval system of rule. By 1420, these 
city-states were financial and political great powers yet 
lacked the will and capacity to transform the medieval 
system of rule as such (Arrighi, 1994: 39-40).  
As Halperin (2004: 107) notes, this was an accumulation 
strategy that ensured ‘that the benefits of expanding 
production would be retained solely by the property-
owning classes’ in that it was unnecessary to redistribute 
national income so as to turn the working classes into a 
domestic market. Halperin also argues that this strategy 
avoided the production of a significant and concentrated 
proletariat with the capacity to organize as a force to be 
reckoned with; this seems to overlook the British and 
French situations at least (consider the Chartists and June 
1848 respectively), and it would seem more plausible to 
say with Marx that the growth and organisation of the 
proletariat was an unintended albeit logical consequence 
of the development of classical capitalism, which in turn 
(to anticipate) was a key factor in the crisis of that 
capitalism and its replacement by organized capitalism. 
Such a transformation only happened two centuries later 
as the United Provinces emerged from a condition of 
systemic chaos – essentially, intra-European power-
struggles over the control of long-distance trade routes 
and subjugated non-European territories – to seize ‘the 
opportunity to transform the European system of rule to 
suit the requirements of the accumulation of capital on a 
world-scale’ (ibid.: 40). Thus, with the peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, a new world system of rule emerged, 
the signal features of which were the recognition of the 
sovereignty of states and the freedom of private 
enterprise (ibid.: 36-47, chapter 2). As Silver and Slater 
(1999) point out, Dutch hegemony was socially grounded 
in the rise to power of the propertied classes – i.e. the 
landowning capitalists, the mercantile oligarchy, and the 
colonial settlers. Moreover, as an emergent middle class 
widened its share in prosperity, social and political 
stability was secured. 
The epoch of classical capitalism was also the epoch of 
British world hegemony (Arrighi, 1994: 47-58, chapter 
3). The Dutch oligarchy, Arrighi notes, never really came 
to govern ‘the system they had created’  (ibid.: 47); 
rather, the principal beneficiaries of the new world 
system of rule were France and England, and the period 
from 1652 to 1815 very much revolved around struggles 
between the two over world hegemony. Finally, British 
free trade imperialism – ‘a world system of rule which 
both expanded and superseded the Westphalian system’ 
(ibid.: 53) – emerged as the new hegemonic order.  
This hegemonic order was characterized by (a) the 
emergence of a new group of ‘states controlled by 
national communities of property-holders’ (Arrighi, 
1994: 53) which joined the dynastic and oligarchic states; 
(b) the expansion of colonial empires in the non-Western 
world, with Britain controlling ‘the lion’s share of this 
conquest’ (ibid.: 54) and the City of London emerging as 
an instrument of governance of the inter-state system; (c) 
an entirely new system of world government – namely a 
world market shaped by Britain’s unilateral adoption of 
the practice and ideology of free trade, and thus 
orchestrating ‘world-wide networks of dependence on, 
and allegiance to, the expansion of the wealth and power 
of the UK’ (ibid.: 55).  
Movements from below during this period were of course 
many and varied; in most cases, as Marx noted (albeit 
with different terminology), their struggles tended to 
consist of a resistance to disembedding which was not 
only unable to provide an alternative movement project 
around which subordinate resistance could rally, but by 
the very terms of its organisation tended to reinforce the 
power of older traditional elites. Those few cases of 
convincing popular organisation on a large scale (most 
notably some heretic movements, elements of the radical 
Reformation and the English Levellers (Cohn 1970, Hill 
1975, Brailsford 1977) remained isolated and were easy 
targets for coercion by traditional and rising elites alike. 
The new hegemonic order was socially grounded in the 
consolidation of the power of the propertied classes in the 
form of an alliance between the emergent industrial 
bourgeoisie and the entrenched landowning aristocracy 
(Silver and Slater, 1999; Halperin, 2004a) in the face of 
disturbing new threats from below and most particularly 
the radical left of the Atlantic Revolutions. The years 
between 1776 and 1789 witnessed the alienation of 
colonial settlers and metropolitan middle classes from 
submission and allegiance to the aristocratic oligarchies, 
the mobilisation of broader popular forces behind these 
groups, and the embryonic development and rapid defeat 
of independent popular agendas in the process  
The second epoch in our mapping of historical capitalism 
spans from the late eighteenth century to the late 
nineteenth century, and we shall refer to it as classical 
capitalism7. This epoch was indeed characterized by a 
disembedded accumulation strategy in which the power 
of capital reigned supreme. This was achieved through a 
‘dualistic system of internal restriction and external 
expansion’ (Halperin, 2004a: 39) in which industrial 
production of capital goods and high-cost consumption 
goods was directed towards external markets secured 
‘through cooperation with or imperialist exploitation of 
other states and territories, both within and outside 
Europe’, whilst domestically ‘the geographic and sectoral 
spread of industrialization’ was curtailed and ‘the 
continued use of methods of increasing absolute surplus 
value’ prevailed (ibid.: 108. 117, 107).  
From 1815 on, the UK and the Holy Alliance developed a 
‘conservative and restorationist agenda’, in which the 
middle classes – having been granted a cut in the general 
prosperity of the era – remained loyal to ‘an unreformed, 
corrupt, and unrepresentative political system’ (Silver 
and Slater, 1999: 173). From the 1830s in Britain and 
France, and in the aftermath of 1848 east of the Rhine, 
the system was reformed so as to grant the middle classes 
a share in power as well (ultimately leading to the 
reconstruction of dynastic states as nation-states) while 
keeping the poor firmly in their place. Silver and Slater 
write: ‘Keeping the poor away from political power came 
to be seen as a fundamental precondition for the 
                                            
7 We designate the epoch as classical rather than liberal in light 
of Halperin’s (2004a) recent powerful refutation of conceptions 
of this era as one in which an industrial bourgeoisie – enjoying 
the privilege of ‘a relatively open political space’ (ibid.: 26) 
which had emerged in the wake of the bourgeois revolutions – 
displaced the landed aristocracy and stood at the helm of an 
industrial capitalist economy well integrated into the national 
economy and characterized by free competition. 
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functioning of laissez-faire and the protection of private 
property’ (ibid.: 174). Following 18488, the continental 
bourgeoisie’s embrace of reaction solidified as ‘symbiotic 
alliances between old landed wealth and new industrial 
elites were established’ (ibid.: 176; see also Halperin, 
2004a: 176-9).  
This third epoch in our mapping of historical capitalism 
spans from the late nineteenth century to the third quarter 
of the twentieth century, and we shall refer to it as 
organized capitalism9. It attained its fullest form after 
WWII, in advanced capitalist countries, although it had 
precursors in the war economies of the First World War, 
in the new Soviet state, fascism and the New Deal. 
This process was symbolised by the Frankfurt 
Assembly’s reliance on the Prussian military against the 
urban poor, and the June Days in Paris: the old dynastic 
and aristocratic regimes could no longer rule except at the 
point of a sword, yet the rising middle classes could not 
defend their embryonic states except by reliance on the 
old military power. Thus, Halperin provides the 
following characterization of the European capitalist class 
in the epoch of classical capitalism:  
In its ideal-typical form after WWII, this epoch came to 
be characterized by a re-embedded accumulation strategy 
characterized by: (i) an inward-oriented economic growth 
model centred on based on Fordist mass production for 
domestic mass consumption (see e.g. Halperin, 2004, 
2003: Chapter 8; Harvey, 1990: Chapter 8); (ii) an 
interventionist state which actively sought to (a) manage 
the economy to stimulate and regulate investments and 
growth, secure full employment, and diminish the effects 
of business cycles through Keynesian fiscal and monetary 
policies, and (b) provided for the welfare of its citizens 
through ‘the social redistribution of market-generated 
income and the provision of social programs’ (Petras and 
Veltmeyer, 2001: 14) through the welfare state (see e.g. 
Halperin, 2004, 2003: Chapter 8; Harvey, 2005: 10-11; 
Armstrong et. al., 1991: 137-41; Silver, 2003: Chapter 4).  
The capitalist class in Europe was formed from a fusion of 
Europe’s industrial and landowning classes. This class, 
overall, was dominated not by a new industrial capitalist 
bourgeoisie, but by Europe’s traditional landowning and 
aristocratic elite … Throughout the nineteenth century, 
Europe’s most effective elites were traditional and 
aristocratic, landowning and rent-receiving, and oligarchic 
(2004a: 24).       
This class constituted ‘a single transregional elite, and 
their broadly similar characteristics, interests, 
capabilities, and policies were constituted and reproduced 
through interaction, connections, and interdependence’ 
(ibid.: 34). Indeed, this transregional elite controlled 
immense power resources – in particular, direct or 
indirect access to the state – which enabled the conduct of 
‘a class struggle throughout the nineteenth century by 
means of a purposive, determined, and essentially 
coherent legislative, legal, military, and political assault 
on labourers, and peasants’ (ibid.: 36).  
In the newly independent nation-states of the South, 
developmentalism came to predominate as an 
accumulation strategy. Developmentalism can in its 
ideal-typical form be said to exhibit three crucial features: 
(i) the achievement of rapid industrialization as the 
principal objective; (ii) the implementation of this project 
through a coalition of political elites, state managers and 
domestic capital, and, to a certain extent, labour; and (iii) 
the state as the senior partner in this coalition. The 
accumulation strategy that was to be pursued derived its 
“developmental” character from the state’s funnelling of 
‘the flow of domestic private investments into sectors 
with high social returns and away from those in which 
returns on investment may have brought enormous 
private profits, but were of less developmental 
significance’ (ibid.: 229)10.  
This offensive movement from above, and the fusion of 
“old” and “new” propertied classes upon which it was 
based, subsisted well into the twentieth century, and only 
decisively cracked and unravelled in the “European civil 
war” (Pavone 1994) from 1917 to 1945. However, it 
faced increasing opposition from below with the 
development of working-class organisation and peasant 
nationalisms, which threatened this classical capitalist 
order time and time again, from the Paris Commune to 
the revolutionary years of 1916 – 1923 – events which 
led to the collapse of empires in France (1871), Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, Tsarist Russia and Turkey and the 
collapse of the classical capitalist order. 
‘The United Kingdom’, Arrighi (1994: 58) writes, 
‘exercised world governmental functions until the end of 
the nineteenth century’. From the 1870s onwards, its role 
as world hegemon was challenged by the United States 
and Germany, with the US gradually emerging as the 
stronger of the two contenders as its domestic economy 
became the hub of the world market due to ‘more or less 
unilateral transfers of labour, capital and entrepreneurship 
flowing from the rest of the world to its political 
jurisdiction’ (ibid.: 61). The decades leading up to WWI 
witnessed an escalation of interstate rivalry directly 
related to conflicts over the trajectory of colonial 
expansion, as well as worldwide social protest directed 
As the old elites could no longer rely simply on their 
economic and political power for survival in the face of 
popular mobilisation, new movement projects from above 
developed with the aim of mobilising subordinate groups 
behind elite agendas. Conservative nationalisms, 
imperialism, fascism, authoritarian populism and 
Christian Democracy all variously played this role, 
offering a new lease of life for capitalism (as many 
observers noted at the time).        
                                            
                                            
9 We use this term rather than ‘monopoly capitalism’ to stress 
that, as Lash and Urry (1987) observe, it is characterised by 
organisation from below (in the form of trade unions, socialist 
and communist parties, peasant movements etc.) as much as 
from above – whether that organisation is successful in 
achieving some measure of power, or whether it is successfully 
countered by social movements from above which then have to 
rely on their own forms of popular mobilisation. 
8 Halperin (2004a: 176) notes that during the first half of the 
nineteenth century ‘the industrial and commercial classes 
attempted to wrest a share of political power from the traditional 
landowning classes. However, each attempt, whether successful 
or not, was followed by a period of conservative retrenchment’. 
And as we note in the following, the revolutionary turmoil of 
1848 ‘brought about a decisive and irrevocable fusion of 
landowning and capitalist interests’ (ibid.: 178).   
10 Developmentalism can usefully be thought of as the ‘Third 
World variant’ of the embedded accumulation strategy which 
emerged in the advanced capitalist countries during the same 
period  (Robinson, 2004: 41; see also Kiely, 2002 and Petras and 
Veltmeyer, 2001).   
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against the dual exclusion of non-western and 
propertyless people from representation and prosperity.  
This systemic chaos first exploded with WWI itself and 
consequently the Russian Revolution and then for a 
second time with the onset of WWII. In the aftermath of 
the second explosion, the US rose to hegemonic position 
by restoring Westphalian principles, and by governing 
and remaking this system.  
US hegemony ushered in the establishment of an 
international institutional apparatus which ‘considerably 
restricted the rights and powers of sovereign states to 
organize relations with other states and with their own 
subjects as they see fit’ (Arrighi, 1994: 67). The 
institutions in question are of course the UN and the 
Bretton Woods couplet – the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. As Arrighi notes, these 
institutions ‘either became supplementary instruments 
wielded by the US government in the exercise of its 
world hegemonic functions or … were impeded in the 
exercise of their own institutional functions’ (ibid.: 68)11. 
This was a hegemonic order generally characterized by a 
recognition of ‘greater governmental responsibility for 
economic regulation and for the welfare of its subjects’.  
In terms of world trade, this was reflected in the 
transition from a system of free-trade imperialism to a 
system of free enterprise, i.e. ‘a strategy of bilateral and 
multilateral intergovernmental negotiation of trade 
liberalization, aimed primarily at opening up other states 
to US commodities and enterprise’ (Arrighi, 1994: 71). In 
terms of international monetary regulation, the relative 
embeddedness of US hegemony was expressed in the 
regulation of “world money” by the US Federal Reserve 
System in cooperation with the central banks of other 
select states, which marked a clear departure from ‘the 
nineteenth century system of private regulation based on 
and controlled by the London-based cosmopolitan 
networks of haute finance’ (ibid.: 71-2). 
 The great challenge of the post-WWII era and the Cold 
War order was that of curtailing the great waves of global 
social unrest that had engulfed the first half of the 
twentieth century – i.e. the challenges to the status quo 
constituted by the offensive social movements from 
below of the working classes and non-Western peoples 
(Silver and Slater, 1999; Silver, 2003).  
In the context of the defeat of the movements of 1916-23 
and the military occupation of Europe and much of Asia 
by 1945, these movements were met with a combination 
of reformist responses from above and the threat of a 
military option should they push for further advances. 
Labour militancy in the advanced capitalist countries of 
the North was sought to be defused through the 
establishment of a ‘mass consumption social contract’ 
and ‘a truce based on exchange’ (Silver and Slater, 1999: 
205) between capital and labour, where capital and the 
state accepted unionism, the unions accepted capital’s 
right to administer the production process, and 
government intervened with macroeconomic tools to 
secure full employment. This arrangement was bolstered 
by a regime of international economic institutions which 
recognized ‘that states have a right and a duty to protect 
their workers, businesses and currencies from 
annihilation by unregulated market forces’ (ibid.: 206).  
The challenge of national liberation in the colonial 
countries of the South ‘was met (and defused) through 
decolonization and a major expansion of the Westphalian 
system’ (Silver and Slater, 1999: 209). As Silver (2003: 
157-8) notes, this achievement led to a rupturing of the 
populist nexus of elites and popular classes that had 
propelled national liberation movements forward, which 
in turn meant that ‘the reform basket that was offered to 
Third World workers was far emptier than that offered to 
First World workers’ (ibid.: 157). Yet, we should not lose 
sight of the fact that the rapid urbanization that unfolded 
in the South from 1950-70 led to the inauguration of state 
programmes to meet the employment and subsistence 
needs of the emergent poor and middle-class urbanites 
through price subsidies and public services (Walton and 
Seddon, 1994: 46-7). Thus developmentalism was 
nothing short of a ‘social pact’ with ‘an urban crowd that 
had demonstrated its disruptive muscle earlier in the 
century’ based on ‘a bargain between the state and the 
urban poor’ in which the social wage guarantee was 
exchanged for political acquiescence and loyalty (ibid.: 
47-8). Moreover, developmentalism was bolstered by an 
international economic regime which allowed a certain 
space for national development.  
The defensive social movement from above which was 
crucial in giving shape to organized capitalism was 
spearheaded by a transatlantic ruling class, the origins of 
which can be traced to Woodrow Wilson’s “Crusade for 
Democracy” in 1917  (van der Pijl, 1984)12. During the 
era of the New Deal, he argues, the American bourgeoisie 
was able to articulate a strategy of ‘corporate liberalism’ 
– essentially a combination of the ‘productivist class 
compromise based on the synchronization of relative 
surplus value with the expansion of effective demand’ 
which was characteristic of Fordism with a ‘democratic 
universalism’ which recognized claims for national 
sovereignty’ (ibid.: xv) – which became the basis for ‘a 
specifically Atlantic cohesion’ (ibid.: xv) of dominant 
social groups13.     
                                            
                                            
12 Indeed, van der Pijl (1995, 1998) has more recently traced the 
origins of the transatlantic ruling class as far back as 1688 – a 
rupture which, he argues, ‘sealed the series of transformations by 
which the vestiges of royal absolutism and feudal forms of social 
protection in England had been torn down’ (1998: 64) – and 
argued that its constitution was complete by WWI. However, 
this perspective has recently come in for some hard criticism by 
Halperin (2004a: 33), who argues that ‘if classes bear the mark 
of past centuries, then, clearly, the European capitalist 
bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century was shaped by a different 
legacy than that of the US capitalist class … [T]he lack of a 
feudal past and of parasitic classes and strata from the past 
allowed the United States to rationalize production and labour. 
In Europe, however, the decaying classes resisted the spread of  
“Americanism” to Europe because the new methods of 
production threatened to undermine them’. Thus, Halperin 
argues that transatlantic relations started to seriously ‘shape the 
socioeconomic and political character of industrial capitalist 
development only during the period of the world wars’ (ibid.: 
31).  
11 Importantly, Arrighi calls attention to the fact that ‘throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank played little or no role in the regulation of world 
money in comparison with, and in relation to, a select ensemble 
of national and central banks, led by the US Federal Reserve 
System. It was only with the crisis of US hegemony in the 1970s 
and, above all, in the 1980s that for the first time the Bretton 
Woods organizations rose to prominence in global monetary 
regulation’. 
13 Van der Pijl (1984: xvi, chapters 5, 6, and 7) delineates the 
construction of transatlantic class unity as proceeding through 
three US offensives: the Roosevelt offensive, the Marshall 
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The fourth epoch in our mapping of historical capitalism 
spans from the 1970s until the present, and we shall refer 
to it as global neoliberal capitalism14. We develop our 
analysis of global neoliberal capitalism in the next 
section, and hence have less to say about it here than 
what has been the case with the three previous epochs. In 
terms of accumulation strategies, the current epoch of 
capitalism is characterized by a thoroughly disembedded 
and thoroughly flexible accumulation strategy, which has 
allowed for a genuinely global organization of the 
production and exchange of commodities.  
The jury is arguably still out on the question of world 
hegemony. Whilst there seems to be agreement on the 
decline of US hegemony15, there is considerable 
disagreement as to its replacement. Robinson (2004: 129) 
argues that the current era is witnessing ‘the decline of 
U.S. supremacy and the early stages of the creation of a 
transnational hegemony through supranational structures 
that are not yet capable of providing the economic 
regulation and political conditions for the reproduction of 
global capitalism’. Arrighi (1994; 2005a/b) on the other 
hand, has asserted that China is emerging as a possible 
new hegemon in what he perceives to still be a world 
system where states contend for hegemony. Harvey 
(2003: Chapter 2) argues along similar lines, but point to 
the possibilities of discerning ‘the faint outlines of a 
Eurasian power bloc’ (ibid.: 85) which may come to don 
the mantle of world hegemon. The most plausible 
interpretation to our mind is that as yet no successful 
movement project from above has emerged which has 
garnered the consent of the relevant elites, let alone of 
broader subordinate groups – a situation of extreme 
importance for the movement of movements, which seeks 
to interrupt the process of capitalist reproduction (and 
thus prevent a fifth epoch of capitalism under new 
hegemony) precisely at this moment of emergent organic 
crisis. 
As for the social foundations, the rupturing of ‘the mass 
consumption social contract’ of organized capitalism 
leads to an increasing degree of exclusion and the 
structural irrelevance of ever greater segments of the 
world’s population as both producers and consumers. In 
short, this is an epoch of capitalism that has been 
decisively shaped by an offensive social movement from 
above, spearheaded by the emergent transnational 
capitalist class (Robinson, 2004: Chapter 3).  
 
Part 3: Neoliberalism as a Social Movement From 
Above 
 
3.1: Things Fall Apart; the Truce Lines Cannot Hold  
Organized capitalism was consolidated after 1945, and 
with this came the so-called golden age of capitalism. In 
the advanced capitalist countries, the decades of the 
1950s-60s were marked by strong and stable rates of 
economic growth, substantial increases in the material 
welfare of the working population, and relative social 
tranquillity (Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison, 1991: 
Chapter 8; Harvey, 1990: Chapter 8; Halperin, 2004: 
283). For the newly independent countries of the South, 
the 1950s-60s were similarly “golden years” with 
substantial growth rates (Hewitt, 1992; Petras and 
Veltmeyer, 2001: 14). However, from the mid- and late-
1960s, it was clear that there would not be peace in the 
valley for much longer.  
In the latter half of the 1960s, corporate/monopoly 
capitalism increasingly ran out of steam in the North as 
productivity and profitability went into decline (see, e.g. 
Harvey, 1990: Chapter 9; Armstrong et. al., 1991: 
Chapter 11). The unfolding of the crisis continued in the 
early 1970s: unemployment and inflation soared; fiscal 
crises erupted, following the dollar crisis of 1971 the 
dollar/gold convertibility was disbanded, and in 1973 the 
Bretton Woods system as such collapsed; finally, the oil 
crisis of 1973-4 conjoined with the economic crash of 
1974 to bring ‘the golden years to an abrupt and painful 
halt’ (Armstrong et. al., 1991: 221, chapters 12-13; 
Helleiner, 1994).  
                                                               
offensive, and the Kennedy offensive – with the latter covering 
the latter half of the 1960s. 
14 Robinson uses the term ‘globalization’ for the fourth epoch of 
capitalism to stress its transnational character. In our opinion this 
constitutes a conflation of what Sklair (2002, 2005) calls 
‘generic globalization’ with ‘capitalist globalization’, the former 
referring to the emergence of material infrastructure that allows 
for the development of ‘transnational social spaces in which 
qualitatively new forms of cosmopolitanism flourish’ and the 
latter referring to the ‘historically contingent dominant form’ of 
globalization (Sklair, 2005: 57, 2002: 5). Maintaining this 
distinction, we submit, is crucial to our capacity to conceive of 
alternative globalization. The concept of disorganised capitalism 
(Lash and Urry 1987), while providing a neat counter-balance to 
that of organised capitalism, remains too rooted at the nation-
state level to provide a useful handle on the global 
transformations of the period in question. In essence, what is 
experienced as disorganisation at a national level represents a 
new kind of organisation at a transnational level, with its own 
transnational elites and institutions. Much like the world-systems 
critique of dependency theory, we are here arguing that effective 
analysis must include a global dimension. Put another way, there 
is no disagreement with Lash and Urry over the question of the 
new accumulation strategy, but their approach does not help with 
the question of global hegemony. 
According to Holloway (1995: 22), this constituted ‘a 
crisis in the particular pattern of the containment of the 
power of labour’. Given its rigid character, Fordism as an 
accumulation strategy was vulnerable to workers’ 
resistance in the workplace, capital had increasingly 
come to rely on ‘[t]he monetisation of conflict’ through 
wage increases (ibid.: 24). This became a costly affair as 
a wave of strikes rattled Europe from 1968-70 and 
substantial wage gains were made (ibid.: 24; Armstrong 
et. al. 1991: Chapter 12). Moreover, the ‘indirect costs of 
exploitation’ in the form of welfare state expenditures 
also escalated as a result of struggles for the expansion of 
social rights and benefits (Holloway, 1995: 25-6). 
Workers’ revolt against ‘capital’s right to command’ 
(ibid.: 23) of course paralleled and was closely 
intertwined with the emergence of a new generation of 
popular social movements that took aim at the discipline 
and control that permeated the social organization of 
needs and capacities in ‘organized modernity’ (Wagner, 
1994; see e.g. Katsiaficas, 1987; Arrighi, Hopkins and 
Wallerstein, 1989, Hall, 1983, and Harman, 1998 on the 
movements of 1968). All in all, dominant social groups 
15 In short, the US lost its industrial hegemony in the late 1960s, 
and its financial hegemony unravelled by the late 1990s. It is in 
this context that the recent turn to military unilateralism under 
the Bush-regime must be understood, as ‘a high-risk approach to 
sustaining US-domination, almost certainly through military 
command over global oil resources’ (Harvey, 2003: chapters 2 
and 5; see also Arrighi, 2005a/b) – a reliance on coercion rather 
than consent which is unlikely to be viable in the medium term. 
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had on their hands ‘a fundamental crisis of ‘normality’ 
affecting all aspects of the post-war order …’ (Overbeek 
and Van Der Pijl, 1993: 14) – that is, they had on their 
hands an organic crisis (see also Harvey, 2005: 15).   
By this time, the movement projects from below that 
burst upon the stage of world history in 1968 had waned 
from a “war of manoeuvre” to a “war of position” (Cox, 
2002), in the face of a combination of the threat of 
coercive power (made visible in various ways in Prague, 
Paris and Derry) and the removing of official protection 
for some of the most indefensible relics of organized 
capitalism (such as private patriarchy, legalised racism 
and the Vietnam War). 
If we are to understand the global character of the crisis, 
we also have to consider the collapse of 
developmentalism in the South, which is in turn related to 
the strong wave of financial expansion that took off in the 
early 1970s. By 1970, the London-centred Eurodollar 
market had become so substantial as to constitute a 
liability to the US as it was profoundly out of proportion 
to the government’s gold reserves. This only added to the 
already substantial pressure on maintaining the dollar by 
a steadily worsening US balance of payments, thus the 
convertibility of the dollar into gold was cancelled in 
1971 and floating exchange rates were adopted in 1973 
(Armstrong et. al., 1991: 162-8, 207-11; McMichael, 
1996: 115; Helleiner, 1994). The oil crisis of 1973-4 only 
added fuel to the fire as the dollar profits – so-called 
petrodollars – were funnelled into offshore capital 
markets (Armstrong et. al., 1991: 207-210, 221-225; 
McMichael, 1996: 116-17).  
The neoliberal project thus emerged as an offensive 
social movement from above with the capacity to give 
direction to the emergent process of change in the social 
organization of needs and capacities. This was indeed an 
uneven process, but by the 1990s neoliberalism had come 
to define public policy in the advanced capitalist 
countries (Harvey, 2005: 15, 87-93; see also Hay (1999) 
and Watkins (2004) on neoliberalism and the New 
Labour phenomenon). What is more, the erstwhile 
communist states of Eastern Europe underwent neoliberal 
“shock therapy” from the early 1990s onwards (Gowan, 
1995, 1999: Chapter 9), following revolutions in 
weakened states which led to little substantial 
institutionalisation of popular power but rather an 
expansion of capitalist social relations eastwards. Banks thus increasingly looked to the South to find an 
outlet for the petrodollars which flooded the market, and 
governments in the South were eager to borrow, both as a 
means of covering the increased need for foreign 
exchange in the wake of the oil crisis and as a means of 
gaining some autonomy from the financial system and 
their subordinate role in this system (McMichael, 1996: 
117). The South entered into a spiral of debt-led growth 
(McMichael 1996: 115-17; Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1992; 
Walton and Seddon, 1994: 14-15). Towards the end of 
1970s interest rates skyrocketed and inflation rates fell as 
a consequence of the restrictive monetary policies 
introduced in advanced capitalist countries, thus 
increasing the cost of borrowing; oil prices soared again 
at the same time as the terms of trade and demand for 
exports from the South declined (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 
1992; Walton and Seddon, 1994: 14-15). Walton and 
Seddon (1994: 15) sum up the scenario: ‘The widening 
payments deficits either had to be financed, by more 
borrowing, or else their economies “adjusted” to bring 
demand for foreign exchange into better balance with the 
decreased supply’.  
In the South, the choice between widening payments 
deficits through borrowing or adjusting the economy so 
as to achieve balance between the demand and supply of 
foreign exchange was resolved in favour of the latter 
option through the imposition of structural adjustment 
programmes by the World Bank/IMF couplet. Within the 
World Bank neoliberal orthodoxy had come to define the 
conception of sound economic policy in the mid-1970s, 
and there had been a reorientation from project loans to 
policy loans – i.e. from loans for the development of 
public infrastructure to loans granted on conditionalities 
linked to fundamental changes in economic policy 
(Walton and Seddon, 1994: 17-19; McMichael, 1996: 
149, 159).  
Thus, at the heart of structural adjustment programmes 
lay loans granted on the condition that governments carry 
out currency devaluations, reductions in public 
expenditure and deficits, and removals of price subsidies 
(Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1992: 58)16. In the 1980s, it was 
primarily Africa and Latin America that fell under the 
sway of structural adjustment (see e.g. Cheru, 1989; 
Green, 1995; Veltmeyer and Petras, 1997). India entered 
the vortex of neoliberal restructuring in the early 1990s, 
and East Asia in the late 1990s (see e.g. Corbridge and 
Harriss, 2000; Ghosh and Chandrasekhar, 2000). 
In the North, the initial response from above to the crisis 
was that of a defensive offsetting strategy of credit 
expansion, which with the final crash of 1974 was 
exposed as a moribund project. Thus, from the mid-1970s 
onwards an offensive strategy crystallized around ‘a 
return of the market’, an effort to rupture the class 
compromise of corporate/monopoly capitalism, and yet 
‘contain social reproduction within the limits of its 
capitalist form’ (Bonefeld, 1995: 45, 49) – neoliberal 
restructuring came to define the agenda of dominant 
social groups. Based on neoclassical economic 
orthodoxy, neoliberalism has centred on restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policies and rolling back the 
interventionist state through reduced public expenditure 
on welfare programmes, tax cuts, privatization of 
publicly owned enterprises, and deregulation of industry 
and the labour market (Armstrong et. al., 1991: Chapter 
17). The ‘dramatic consolidation [of neoliberalism] as a 
new economic orthodoxy regulating public policy at the 
state level in the advanced capitalist world’ (Harvey, 
2005: 22) occurred with the rise to power of the New 
Right in Great Britain and the USA in 1979 (see Jessop, 
Bromley and Ling, 1988; Piven and Cloward, 1982).  
 
3.2 The House that Neoliberalism Built 
In a nutshell, neoliberal restructuring is ‘a political 
project to re-establish the conditions for capital 
accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites’ 
(Harvey, 2005: 19) through the obliteration of ‘the 
                                            
16 The World Bank has of course altered its policy approach 
since the 1980s, but as Cammack (2002, 2004) so brilliantly 
demonstrates, the gist remains the same: ‘[The World Bank’s] 
principal objective is the systematic transformation of social 
relations and institutions in the developing world, in order to 
generalise and facilitate proletarianization and capitalist 
accumulation on a global scale, and build specifically capitalist 
hegemony through the promotion of legitimating schemes of 
community participation and country ownership’ (2004: 190).   
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collective structures that may impede the pure market 
logic’ (Bourdieu, 1998:1) – i.e. an offensive social 
movement from above seeking to disembed the 
accumulation of capital from those restrictions which 
were imposed upon it during the epoch of organized 
capitalism.  
 
The rapid increase in poverty in employed households as 
well as the record-breaking levels of unemployment that 
characterize the present17 are but some of the trends that 
indicate that the Fordist accumulation strategy of mass-
production for mass consumption – and the balance of 
class power upon which it rested – has had its day. In its 
place, a new strategy of flexible accumulation has 
emerged. Harvey sums up its main features:  
Flexible accumulation … is marked by a direct confrontation 
with the rigidities of Fordism. It rests on flexibility with 
respect to labour processes, labour markets, products and 
patterns of consumption. It is characterized by the emergence 
of entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing 
financial services, new markets, and, above all, greatly 
intensified rates of commercial, technological, and 
organizational innovation’ (1990: 147). 
How has this contributed to increase the power of capital 
over labour? Harvey points out flexible accumulation has 
entailed ‘stronger pressures of labour control’ as well as 
‘high levels of ‘structural’ … unemployment, rapid 
destruction and reconstruction of skills, modest (if any) 
gains in the real wage … and the roll-back of trade union 
power’ and ‘flexible work regimes and labour contracts’ 
in the form of ‘increasing reliance upon part-time, 
temporary or sub-contracted work arrangements’ (ibid.: 
149-50). This has yielded a labour market with a clear 
core-periphery structure – a core-periphery structure 
which is in turn deeply gendered and racialized18. The 
sum effect of these changes has been to ‘undermine 
working-class organization and transform the objective 
basis for class struggle’ (ibid.: 153) that was typical of 
the organization of production and accumulation under 
Fordism -  ranging from organized strikes to everyday 
practices of resistance in the workplace19. 
However, in order to genuinely understand how this 
offensive social movement from above has succeeded in 
its efforts at disembedding accumulation – and thus 
restoring the class power of capital – we have to look 
beyond the ‘hidden abode of production’ (Marx, 1990: 
290) to the dramatic process of ‘intensive expansion’ 
(Robinson, 2004: 7) through which the ‘cultural and 
political institutions that fettered capitalism are being 
swept aside, paving the way for the total 
commodification of social life worldwide’ (ibid.: 7).  
The glaring discrepancy between, on the one hand, the 
sluggish growth rates of the fast 25 years compared to the 
heyday of organized capitalism, and, on the other hand, 
the exponential escalation in socioeconomic inequalities20 
signals the extent to which ‘the main substantive 
achievement of neoliberalization has been to redistribute 
rather than to generate wealth and income’ (Harvey, 
2005: 159). The intensive expansion of capitalism and its 
redistributive effects are best understood via Harvey’s 
(2003: Chapter 4, 2005: Chapter 6) concept of 
‘accumulation by dispossession’. Accumulation by 
dispossession refers to ‘the continuation and proliferation 
of practices’ referred to by Marx as “primitive 
accumulation”, centred on the expropriation of non-
commodified and de-commodified practices through 
which human needs are satisfied and on their integration 
in the orbit of the expanded reproduction of capital21.  
Accumulation by dispossession proceeds by four routes: 
(i) privatization and commodification, the primary goal of 
which ‘has been to open up new fields for capital 
accumulation in domains hitherto regarded off-limits to 
the calculus of profit-availability’; (ii) financialization, 
which has functioned as a modality for redistribution 
through ‘speculation, predation, fraud, and thievery’; (iii) 
the management and manipulation of crisis, closely 
associated with financialization, which has ‘evolved into 
the fine art of deliberative redistribution of wealth from 
poor countries to the rich’; and (iv) state redistribution 
through privatization and reductions of state expenditures 
revolving around the social wage, and revisions of tax 
codes in favour of capital (Harvey, 2005: 160, 161, 162, 
163).  
                                            
                                           
Much as with flexible accumulation, accumulation by 
dispossession is also a deeply gendered and racialized 
practice. It is gendered in that it entails ‘the 
reprivatization of social reproduction which represents a 
dual movement: one that returns the work of social 
reproduction to where it naturally “belongs”, the 
household; simultaneously, we see women’s traditional 
caring activities increasingly performed in relationships 
that are commodified and societies that are being 
redefined as collections of individuals’ (Bakker, 2004: 
67). It also entails the development of “prison-industrial 
complex” economies and permanent warfare economies 
using coercive state power directly, with (essentially 
male) workforces of prisoners or soldiers subject to 
military labour discipline. 
17 For example, more than 30 million Americans currently fall 
into the category of “working poor” (Shulman, 2004; see also 
Duménil and Lévy, 2004). In 2003, the ILO estimated that there 
were some ‘185.9 million individuals without work and looking 
for work … This is the highest level ever recorded” (ILO, 2004: 
9).  
 
 
20 As Harvey (2005: 154) points out, aggregate global growth 
rates have declined from about 3.5% in the 1960s, via 2.4% in 
the 1970s, to 1.4% in the 1980s and 1.1% in the 1990s. In terms 
of inequality, the ration of the income of the richest fifth of the 
world’s population to that of the poorest fifth increased from 
30:1 in 1960 to 60:1 in 1990 and stood at 74:1 in 1997 (UNDP, 
1999).  
18 See Ehrenreich (2002) and Klein (2001: Chapter 10) for 
graphic accounts of the labour market created by this new 
flexible accumulation 
19 As such, flexible accumulation represents a ”new” solution to 
the ”old” problem of warding off workers power by restricting 
the degree of their concentration that the ruling classes of 
classical capitalism solved via the maintenance of a dualistic 
accumulation strategy (see above). As Harvey (1990: 152) notes, 
this “new” strategy actually also features the rebirth of ‘older 
systems of domestic, artisanal, familial (patriarchal), and 
paternalistic (‘godfather’, ‘guv’nor’ or even mafia-like) labour-
systems … as centrepieces rather than as appendages of the 
production system’.  
21 See also Harvey’s (2003: Chapter 4) original 
statement of the theory of accumulation by 
dispossession, where he relates its increasing salience 
after 1973 to its capacity to function as ‘compensation 
for the chronic problems of overaccumulation arising 
within expanded reproduction’ (ibid.: 156).  
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These elements are themselves racialised – not only 
prison and the military (above all in the US), but also 
households, constructed as defensive spaces against the 
ethnic other (both the genuinely more powerful white 
other and the feared black other). The geographical 
extension of capitalist relationships (in other terms, 
intensified commodification) in formerly state socialist 
countries, in formerly developmentalist countries and 
among semi-peasants adds a further layer of racialised 
exploitation to the mix as it creates new labour forces 
marked by language, skin colour and the vulnerability 
constructed by illegal status or lack of citizenship rights. 
A further return to primitive accumulation takes place in 
the deepening externalisation of economic costs (up to 
and including global warming), the commodification 
inherent in bioengineering, the patenting of living 
organisms, the commercialisation of indigenous 
knowledge etc., and the intensification of crude mining 
and energy extraction activities in hitherto inaccessible, 
or commercially unviable, parts of the planet.  
Neoliberal restructuring has also brought about a spatial 
rescaling of the circuit of capital which further bolsters 
the restoration of class power. The gist of this 
restructuring is an emergent transition from ‘national 
circuits of accumulation that were linked through capital 
flows and commodity exchanges and capital flows’ to 
‘the globalization of the production process itself, or the 
rise of globalized circuits of production and 
accumulation’ (Robinson, 2004: 11).  
Thus, flexible accumulation is instantiated worldwide 
through global production chains which in turn are 
rendered possible by technological and organizational 
innovations which enables the fragmentation of various 
phases of production ‘into component phases that are 
detachable and can be dispersed around the world’ (ibid.: 
17). Moreover, the globalization of the circuit of capital 
has been fuelled by the two-pronged process of, on the 
one hand, ‘worldwide market liberalization and the 
construction of a new regulatory superstructure for the 
global economy’ and, on the other hand, ‘the internal 
restructuring and global integration of each national 
economy’ (ibid.: 78). Indeed, the intensive expansion of 
capitalism through accumulation by dispossession has 
engendered ‘a single unified field for global capitalism’ 
(ibid.: 78).  
The rescaling of the circuit of capital is closely related to 
changes in the character of the capitalist state, in which 
two crucial processes are intertwined: (i) the 
transformation from the welfare and developmental states 
of organized capitalism to neoliberal nation states 
(Robinson, 2004: 121-5; Harvey, 2005: Chapter 3; 
Jessop, 2002: Chapters 2 and 3), and (ii) the 
‘denationalization of the state’ (Jessop, 2002: 195).  
Contrary to both right- and left-wing misperceptions, the 
national state has not withered away with the onset of 
global neoliberal capitalism. Rather, its function and the 
character of its activities have been profoundly changed. 
Whereas during the era of organized capitalism, the 
function of the state was that of maintaining the class 
compromise which had “saved capitalism from the 
capitalists” through a range of social and economic 
interventions and regulations that effectively embedded 
the accumulation of capital, the state now intervenes to 
facilitate and secure the disembedding of capital22: 
These neoliberal states, acting as transmission belts and 
filtering devices for the transnational agenda … provide 
essential services for capital within specific national 
territories. In particular, they perform three essential 
functions: (i) adopt fiscal and monetary policies that assure 
macroeconomic stability; (2) provide the basic infrastructure 
for global economic activity …; and (3) provide social order, 
that is stability, which requires sustaining instruments of 
direct coercion and ideological apparatuses (Robinson, 2004: 
125).  
Given the increasing degree of exclusion that 
characterizes the political economy of global neoliberal 
capitalism (see below) the provision of social order is 
becoming increasingly important, and as Gill’s (2003: 
Chapter 10) analysis of the escalation of panoptic 
practices and power under neoliberalism testifies to, the 
part of the equation of social order which revolves around 
control, containment and coercion is arguable becoming a 
centrepiece in this aspect of the state’s activity. 
The transnational agenda hinted at in the citation from 
Robinson above points towards the process through 
which the state is being denationalized, i.e. the territorial 
and functional reorganization of state capacities both 
upwards towards the transnational level and downwards 
towards sub-national scales. The upward shift of state 
capacities has engendered what Robinson (2004: Chapter 
3; 2001) refers to as a ‘transnational state’.  
The transnational state exists as ‘an emerging network 
that comprises transformed and externally integrated 
national states, together with … supranational economic 
and political forums, and has not yet acquired any 
centralized institutional form’ (Robinson, 2004: 88). 
Within this complex emergent network, supranational 
institutions are ‘gradually supplanting national 
institutions in policy development and global 
management and administration of the global economy’ 
(Robinson, 2003: 166). The downward shift of state 
capacities has engendered what Jessop (2002: 197) refers 
to as ‘regional and/or local states’ which have assumed 
an important role in terms of facilitating the 
competitiveness of ‘regional and local economies in the 
emerging world economy’ (ibid.: 197). Finally, related to 
the denationalization of the state, there is also occurring a 
process of ‘destatization’ (ibid.: 199), i.e. ‘the increased 
importance of quite varied forms (and levels) of 
partnership between official, parastatal and NGOs in 
managing  economic and social relations in which the 
state is often only first among equals’ (ibid.: 199; see also 
Kamat, 2004; Jayasurya, 2001; Jayasurya and Hewison, 
2004).  
Finally, this offensive social movement from above has 
been spearheaded by transnational capital. As ‘the owners 
of transnational capital’ with their interests vested in 
‘global over local or national accumulation’ (ibid.: 47), 
the TCC has acted collectively and consciously as ‘a 
manifest agent of change’ (ibid.: 48) from the late 1970s 
onwards, promoting the neoliberal agenda across the 
globe: ‘the Washington consensus reflected the 
emergence of a new global capitalist bloc under the 
leadership of a transnational elite’ (ibid.: 87).  
                                            
22 As Harvey (2005: Chapter 2) notes, neoliberal strategies were 
pioneered under Pinochet’s dictatorship in Chile and in the wake 
of the fiscal crisis of New York City in the 1970s.  
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Indeed, as Harvey’s (2005: Chapter 2; see also Blyth 
2002) recent analysis demonstrates, this process got 
underway in the early 1970s as the crisis of organized 
capitalism assumed “organic” proportions --- the 
Washington consensus – (i) financialization (innovation 
and deregulation of financial markets), (ii) increasing 
geographical mobility of capital, (iii) the centrality of the 
Wall Street-IMF- Treasury complex, (iv) the global 
diffusion of the neoliberal economic orthodoxy (Harvey, 
2005: 93) – “All of these strands came together in the so-
called ‘Washington Consensus’ of the 1990s” (ibid.: 93). 
At the core of the process of restructuring that this social 
movement from above has pushed forward lies the 
‘newfound relative power of global capital over global 
labour’ (Robinson, 2004: 19) in the context of the defeat 
of 1968, the undermining of the power granted to labour 
within organised capitalism and the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc. This combines with the emergence of what Castells 
(1998: Chapter 2) refers to as a ‘Fourth World’ of 
socially excluded and marginalized groups. The power 
that labour was able to assert relative to capital during the 
epoch of organized capitalism was very much bound up 
with the territorial and institutional limits to accumulation 
inherent to the nation-state system, as national states 
‘enjoyed a varying but significant degree of autonomy to 
intervene in the phase of distribution, capturing and 
redirecting surpluses’ (ibid.: 41).  
This capacity, and concurrently the power of labour vis-
à-vis capital, has been decisively eroded with the onset of 
global neoliberal capitalism; neoliberal restructuring, in 
short, ‘helped free emergent transnational capital from 
the compromises and commitments placed on it by the 
social forces in the nation-state phase of capitalism’ 
(Robinson, 2004: 41). Furthermore, an integral part of the 
political economy of global neoliberal capitalism – and 
the dissolution of the productivist-consumerist class 
compromise on which it was based – is that ‘a significant 
part of the world population is shifting from a structural 
position of exploitation [through the capital-labour 
relation] to a structural position of irrelevance’ (Castells, 
cited in Hoogvelt, 2001: 92).  
 
Some thoughts for a conclusion … 
 
In this paper we have argued for the usefulness of an 
analysis of social structure as the product of social 
movement projects from above, in conflict with 
movements from below. At present the dominant 
movement project from above is neoliberal globalisation, 
an offensive movement project which has mobilised 
economic and political resources to reorganise the ways 
in which human needs and capacities are deployed, so as 
to restore and extend the power of capitalist elites and 
their allies. 
Neoliberalism can at present be assumed to have solved 
the problem of internal cohesion within the capitalist 
class, in ways which we have outlined above (a 
developing transnational state; national state actors who 
see their role as a transmission body for neoliberal 
processes; transnational capitalist and service classes; the 
acceptance by most other capitalist and service class 
actors that their interests are best served by this project). 
Beyond this internal sphere, however, the key problem is 
that of finding a sufficiently broad base of allies who see 
neoliberalism as meeting their needs – in other words, the 
problem of consent23. As Stuart Hall, and more recently 
David Harvey, have remarked, authoritarian populism, or 
what was once the New Right, offers a particular kind of 
solution to this problem: cultural formations which 
encourage in particular the private-sector middle classes 
and ‘traditionalised’ sections of the working class to 
identify with their leaders on primarily ethnic grounds 
(nationalism, racism and militarism), and who have 
sufficiently internalised the message “There is no 
alternative” to turn their focus to distributive arguments 
within neo-liberalism (and hence the conflict with other 
subordinate groups). 
Ultimately, however, such purely ideological solutions to 
the problem of consent are fragile because of the lack of 
an underlying social compact such as that represented by 
Fordism or developmentalism. Stated in its simplest 
terms, neo-liberalism has little in the way of actual 
material advantages to offer to those subordinate groups 
which accept it, because the whole thrust of its 
development is away from the kinds of concessions 
which characterised the period of organised capitalism. 
Hegemony, in Gramscian terms, involves the leading 
groups giving up their corporate interests (ie making 
concessions) in return for a leading role which benefits 
them as members of a broader alliance. This is the 
rational underpinning of popular consent.  
The lack of such concessions, and of an underlying social 
compact, means that neoliberal hegemony is “thinner” 
than that of organised capitalism. This is at present most 
visible in international relations, with the predominance 
of coercion over consent in the development of the “New 
World Order”; it is also visible internally, with increasing 
proportions of the population “excluded” from de facto 
(and often de jure) citizenship, the demobilisation of 
popular organisations (even those organised from above) 
and increasingly punitive policing responses. The house 
that neoliberalism built might just turn out to be a house 
built on sand.  
It is of course here that the “movement of movements” 
confronts this current manifestation of capitalism: in the 
majority world, growing out of the movements of those 
being dispossessed in the breakdown of 
developmentalism; in the minority world, growing out of 
the declining cultural hegemony of the New Right and 
the integrative weakness of institutions such as the 
mainstream media, parliaments and political parties. 
In our view, which we have developed further elsewhere 
(Cox and Nilsen 2005c), it is crucial for the movement of 
movements to push further in this direction of unpicking 
the consent still available to the neoliberal project. In 
their different ways, the social movement projects of 
Latin America, the development of alternative media, the 
social forum movement and summit protests all 
contribute (among others) to this process, which the anti-
war movement has crystallised around opposition to US 
foreign policy. 
In line with our historical argument, however, it should 
be clear that the strength of the New Right rests on the 
defeat of the Old Left, and more broadly on the collapse 
                                            
23 The reason for this emphasis is, firstly, that under normal 
circumstances elites can be relatively confident about their 
control of the means of coercion (assuming that they have the 
consent of those who wield those means); the problem is rather 
how to remain in that position of command and retain sufficient 
legitimacy to do so. 
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of the hegemonic structures underpinning organised 
capitalism. The defensive struggles which characterised 
popular resistance to the rise of the New Right - tied to a 
left-wing version of the Fordist state – were unsuccessful, 
in the North as in the South, and attempting to resuscitate 
them is reminiscent of Marx’s comments about the 
French Revolution pretending to be the Roman Republic, 
or 1848 pretending to be the French Revolution. 
Instead, the movement needs to have the confidence to 
move beyond the immediate issues where struggles start 
to propose a genuinely different world order from below, 
resting on the development of popular capacities and 
needs. Popular consent for alternatives will be gained not 
by harking back to the ghosts of the past, but by drawing 
on and developing the processes that subordinate groups 
are developing in the present. 
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